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PASSIONATE REASON: KIERKEGAARD AND
PLANTINGA ON RADICAL CONVERSION
Richard Otte

It is reasonable to take Kierkegaard and Plantinga as presenting very different approaches to the rationality of adopting religious beliefs. Kierkegaard
says Christian doctrines are absurd, and Plantinga argues that the existence
of God is part of the deliverances of reason. I argue that in spite of these apparent differences, Kierkegaard and Plantinga agree on some foundational
epistemological issues. I begin by exploring the topic of radical conversion, as
discussed by van Fraassen. I use the notion of radical conversion as a tool, to
focus our investigation and illuminate the agreements between Kierkegaard
and Plantinga. Because of the role of passions and affections in epistemology, we will see that Kierkegaard and Plantinga share a basic epistemological
outlook.

When one thinks of philosophers of religion, Soren Kierkegaard and
Alvin Plantinga represent two very different points of view. Kierkegaard
is often regarded as one of the fathers of existentialism and continental
philosophy, and Plantinga revolutionized analytic philosophy of religion.
Continental thinkers approvingly quote Kierkegaard, but he is seldom
referred to by analytic philosophers. Plantinga is one of the most influential analytic philosophers, cited by many, but it would be unusual to
find continental philosophers discussing his works. Because of this, one
common view might be not that Kierkegaard and Plantinga really disagree, but that their ideas are incommensurable in some sense. The idea
here would be that they are talking about very different things using very
different concepts, and their ideas have little to do with each other. Although some have suggested that Plantinga is really a fideist, it is fair to
say that most take Kierkegaard and Plantinga to be at opposing ends of
the philosophical spectrum when it comes to epistemology and the rationality of religious beliefs. Plantinga argues that belief in God’s existence is
part of the deliverances of reason, whereas Kierkegaard is well-known for
saying religious belief is absurd. These philosophers are held to be about
as different as philosophers can get.
In what follows I will argue that this common view is mistaken; deep
down, we find Kierkegaard and Plantinga share a common basic epistemological outlook. Although they appear to have very different views
about reason and religious belief, this is illusory. There is deep agreement
pp. 160–180
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between them, in spite of apparent differences. To see the agreement
between Kierkegaard and Plantinga, we will begin by exploring the philosophical problem of radical conversion in philosophy of science, as it is
developed by Bas van Fraassen. I will use the notion of radical conversion
as a tool to help focus our investigation and bring to light some ideas held
by both Kierkegaard and Plantinga. The problem of radical conversion
arises for many epistemological positions, but there are good reasons to
think some cases of radical conversion are rational. We will then look at
rationality and radical conversion from the perspective of Kierkegaard’s
Johannes Climacus in the Philosophical Crumbs.1 There are many ways to
interpret Kierkegaard’s writings, and in this article I will ignore most of
these debates. I will simply assume one plausible interpretation of Kier
kegaard’s Johannes Climacus, one argued for by Stephen Evans, even
though I am aware that other commentators may disagree. Thus my position might be more accurately described as claiming that one plausible
way of reading Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Crumbs results in Johannes
Climacus and Plantinga having very similar basic epistemologies.2 We
will then discuss the rationality of religious belief according to Plantinga.
We will look at a seldom discussed chapter in Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief, in which he investigates the role of the affections and reason. A
central topic in our investigation will be the role of the passions in epistemology, and we will see that Kierkegaard and Plantinga have much more
in common than is usually thought when it comes to the epistemology of
religious belief.
Radical Conversion
Often we change our beliefs in ways that result in our new beliefs being
very different from what we previously held. Perhaps we acquire some
new evidence and in response we completely change our way of thinking;
if the change is significant enough, we consider these to be examples of
conversion. For example, Antony Flew claims he changed his beliefs and
became a theist on the basis of evidence.3 Let us call cases in which reasoning about evidence produces a significant and important change of
belief “ordinary conversion.” Attempts at providing evidence for religious
belief are attempts at bringing about ordinary conversion. It is important
to see that cases of ordinary conversion are considered rational from the
1
“Philosophical Crumbs” is a translation of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophiske Smuler,”
which has often been translated as “Philosophical Fragments.” Philosophical Crumbs and
Philosophical Fragments are the same work by Kierkegaard.
2
For further discussion of similarities between Kierkegaard and Plantinga, see Stephen
Evans, “Externalist Epistemology, Subjectivity, and Christian Knowledge: Plantinga and
Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006),
183–205, and Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God: Subjectivity as
the Ground of Properly Basic Religious Beliefs,” in Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco, TX:
Baylor University Press, 2006), 169–182.
3
Antony Flew and Roy A. Varghese, There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist
Changed His Mind (New York: HarperOne, 2007).
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perspective of the previous beliefs, once the new evidence is taken into
account; the change from the old to the new beliefs was rational because
it was based on one’s epistemic principles and acquired evidence. In advance of the conversion, one could say that if I came to have such and such
evidence, then I would change to the new beliefs; when I get the evidence,
the new beliefs follow simply from one’s old beliefs, the new evidence,
and the epistemic principles one accepts. From the point of view of the
prior beliefs, there is nothing irrational about this change, even though the
beliefs may change in significant ways.
There are, however, cases of conversion that are more difficult to
account for. In ordinary conversion the person will consider the change rational, because the change is a result of the beliefs and epistemic principles
one holds, as well as the new evidence. But there are cases of conversion
in which the new beliefs cannot be seen as following from one’s beliefs,
epistemic principles, and evidence. In some conversion cases, from the
prior perspective the new beliefs are not arrived at rationally from the
prior beliefs and the new beliefs appear irrational or absurd. From the
prior perspective, there does not seem to be any way to move from the
earlier beliefs to the later beliefs in a rational way. However, from the
posterior perspective, the change from the prior to the posterior beliefs
was completely rational. This is a very puzzling situation. We could, of
course, simply declare that all such cases are irrational, but that would be
too hasty, and simply ignores the accounts of those who have had these
conversion experiences. Bas van Fraassen clearly describes the situation:
The problem is simple to state. Imagine yourself looking back to your past
self, or to our communal past. Say: I can now understand quite well how I
thought at that time, but I see that by those earlier lights what I now think
makes no sense at all. How was it possible for me to go through that fortunate change? That I now see it as fortunate and vindicated does not at all
mean that it was rational, reasonable, or rationally acceptable at the time.
So should I applaud bursts or binges of irrationality as acceptable crisis response? Should I glory in having done precisely what I would now forbid
myself in the name of Reason? Should I give up my commitment to rational management of opinion, since I now applaud that previous unratifiable
change of mind? Or am I just mistaken to think my present views were absurd or unintelligible then? Is the whole idea of radical conversion, of true
revolutions in scientific thought or elsewhere, an illusion?4

Let us call conversions in which the later beliefs are not permitted by the
prior beliefs and new evidence “radical conversion.” Radical conversions
in which according to the prior view there is no possible evidence (evidence assigned a non-zero probability by the prior view) that would allow
a rational change to the posterior view, we will call “extreme conversion.”
Extreme conversion is just a special case of radical conversion; in radical
conversion none of the actual evidence justifies the change to the posterior
Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 72.

4
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beliefs, and according to extreme conversion there is no possible evidence
that justifies the change. The idea, common to both radical and extreme
conversion, is that from the perspective of the old beliefs the new beliefs
are not a proper response given new evidence, but according to the new
beliefs the change was a good response to the evidence. The challenge will
be to give an account whereby cases of radical and extreme conversion
can be rational. Radical conversion can arise whenever one’s prior beliefs
place restrictions on responses to evidence. Epistemologies in which future beliefs are a function of or are limited by rules that apply to old beliefs
and evidence will have difficulties accounting for radical conversion, since
the new beliefs violate the rules in cases of radical conversion.
In The Empirical Stance van Fraassen discusses radical conversion in the
context of scientific revolutions, as described by Feyerabend and Kuhn.
One characteristic of a scientific revolution is that a completely new way
of thinking about issues is adopted, a way that is not reasonable by the
lights of the previous theory. As Kuhn emphasized, the difference in
paradigms is not due to some additional evidence, and there is no way to
reason from the previous paradigm to the new paradigm using evidence.
Yet those who come to adopt the new paradigm see this belief change as
rational. What the old paradigm regards as improper or unreasonable,
the new paradigm sees as an epistemically superior way to account for
the evidence. Thus described, scientific revolutions are clear examples of
radical conversion, and it would be extreme to deny that they exist or that
they are rational. van Fraassen writes:
Yes, there are such changes, so radical that they are characterized by a remarkable historical asymmetry. From the posterior point of view, the prior
can be made intelligible and the change ratified. From the prior position,
however, the posterior view was absurd and the transition to it possible but
incapable of justification. Taken together, these two points may seem less an
answer than a paradox.5

Scientific revolutions raise the puzzle of radical conversion: how can the
belief change be seen to be rational in retrospect, even though prior to the
change it would be viewed as irrational?
Although the puzzle of radical conversion is intuitively clear, if we
wanted we could give a more formal description of it within the framework of traditional Bayesianism, in which belief is changed in accordance
with conditionalization. Suppose we have a Bayesian agent with a prior
probability function on a language such that for all possible evidence
statements in the language, it is not the case that conditionalizing on
some or all of that evidence will result in some proposition H having
a high probability. In other words, there is no way to get to a posterior
probability function in which H is assigned a high probability by conditionalizing on evidence. Suppose the agent changes belief by assigning
van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, 65.

5
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H a high probability, and furthermore considers that change rational;
this describes a case of extreme conversion, because there is no possible
evidence for the prior probability function to conditionalize on and get
the posterior probability function. An agent using orthodox Bayesianism
to manage beliefs will consider any change of belief that assigns H high
probability irrational, even if the belief change were considered rational
from the resulting later point of view. A Bayesian managing beliefs will
consider certain belief change improper, but after the change the belief
change may be seen as a good response to the evidence even though it
violated the deeply held epistemic principles at the time. The question is
how it can be rational to violate one’s deeply held epistemic views.
We do not need to appeal to philosophy of science or Bayesianism in
order to describe cases of radical conversion; it is easy to find examples
in ordinary life. Suppose we have a naturalist who holds all belief change
must be based on sufficient evidence. She has views about what constitutes
sufficient evidence and beliefs about what are proper and improper responses to evidence. She also has thought about the possibility of religious
experience, but holds that religious experience is a result of cognitive processes that are unreliable and thus provides no basis for religious beliefs.
Thinking about what to believe if she were to have a religious experience,
she says that she has thought about possible types of religious experience, but holds they are illusory. Thus she believes she should remain a
naturalist, even if she were to have a religious experience; she holds that it
would be epistemically improper for her to become a theist on the basis of
religious experience. Now suppose that she has a religious experience of
the sort she has considered, and comes to believe that she was previously
in error about these experiences being unreliable; she thus changes her
beliefs and becomes a theist. This is a case of radical conversion; her prior
views do not allow her to take her religious experience as veridical and
become a theist. However, from the point of view of her posterior beliefs,
the change in belief was completely rational; she was correcting an error
in her previous beliefs. According to her previous views on evidential
support, religious experience provides no support for religious beliefs.
But her later views on evidential relations allow religious experience to
support religious belief. The puzzle is to account for the later claim that
the change was rational, even though it appears irrational from the prior
point of view.
One way cases of radical conversion can arise is when the epistemic
principles used in managing beliefs exclude certain responses to experience. The epistemic import of having an experience can be very different
from the epistemic import of thinking about the experience, and having
the experience and imagining myself having the experience can have very
different epistemic consequences. Without having a certain experience, I
may truly believe that the experience would not be veridical, but after
having the experience I may realize that my previous views were wrong. I
hadn’t had the experience, was unfamiliar with it, and my epistemic views
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about it were from an impoverished epistemic position. Thus it can be rational to respond to an experience differently from what I earlier thought
would be rational. Sometimes we undergo radical conversion because we
respond to experience in ways we previously ruled irrational; we consider
this response rational because we now hold that our previous views were
in error.
It is important to distinguish cases of radical conversion from cases in
which we would not be inclined to say the belief change was rational. For
example, someone may ingest a drug knowing that it results in beliefs
known to be false.6 In cases such as this, some may claim the person is no
longer themselves; they have lost control over their beliefs. How to handle
such cases is controversial, but cases of radical conversion need not be
cases like this. In radical conversion the person has not lost control of their
beliefs or ceased to be the same epistemic agent. The problem is how to account for rational beings adopting views that they previously considered
irrational to adopt.
To understand the concept of radical conversion, it may be helpful to
look at the epistemic project of managing one’s beliefs. Although there are
many epistemic projects, one important project is that of responsibly and
rationally managing our beliefs, including belief change. In managing our
beliefs, we make use of beliefs we have about evidence and about what are
proper and improper ways to change belief. Because of this, gaining some
specific evidence and changing certain beliefs may be radical conversion
for some and ordinary conversion for others, depending on other views
about how to manage belief. For example, suppose one holds that seeming
right is always sufficient evidence for a belief. For this person, it may
not be possible to have a radical conversion; any change to a belief that
seems right from the later perspective will be acceptable from the prior
perspective. Now consider an orthodox Bayesian who accepts the requirement of conditionalization. Evidence learned is assigned a probability of
1, but beliefs of degree 1 or 0 cannot be changed by conditionalization.
Thus any evidence belief or any other belief of degree 1 or 0 can never be
changed. For such a person, the possibility of radical conversion looms
large, because we often do change beliefs we were certain of. To determine whether a change of belief is radical conversion, we must not do
so from the perspective of our epistemic situation, but we must consider
the beliefs, epistemic principles, and evidence as it is understood by the
person. From our perspective a person may not fully grasp some evidence
or understand the right evidential relations, but radical conversion depends upon how they view their evidence and epistemic principles, not
on how someone else views them. It is the agent’s epistemic situation that
is relevant, not ours.

6
Bas van Fraassen, “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens,” Philosophical
Studies 77 (1995), 7–37.
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There are other examples of radical conversion; Chihara gives an
example in which someone radically changes their beliefs because of a
newly thought of hypothesis.7 Chihara tells a story in which a suitor for
a princess is given one number a day in something like a red ping-pong
ball, for six days. On the seventh day he is required to guess what number
he will be given; if correct he wins the princess and half the kingdom, but
if wrong he is put to death. The first number is 47, but unfortunately after
six days he can discern no pattern which would indicate to him what the
seventh number is likely to be, and the new evidence hasn’t given him
much reason to change his initial probabilities. While thinking about the
crimson color of the king’s flag, suddenly “something clicks in his head”:
The balls are crimson! “Crimson” has seven letters. There are seven days
in a week. Could the numbers be Gödel numbers spelling out “crimson”?
The king’s logician has written a logic book. I saw it on the bookshelf. Here
it is. Let’s see: what is 47 the Gödel number of? Eureka! It’s “c.” I’ll bet the
seventh letter will be the Gödel number of “n,” that is, 69.8

Chihara points out that simply thinking of the new hypothesis radically changed the suitor’s probabilities and evidence relations, and the
change was not due to any new evidence. The suitor had previously never
considered the hypothesis that the numbers were the Gödel numbers of
“crimson,” but once he thought of it, finding that 47 was the Gödel number
of “c” greatly increased the probability that the seventh number would be
69, the Gödel number of “n.” Chihara argues that even if the suitor had
found out that 47 was the Gödel number of “c” before thinking of the
new hypothesis, this would not have resulted in any change in thinking
the last number was likely to be 69; without thinking of the new hypothesis, the first number being the Gödel number of “c” didn’t mean much
at all. Chihara presented his example as a counterexample to orthodox
Bayesianism, which requires all change of belief be in accord with conditionalization. Without going into the details of Bayesianism, we can say
that rational change of belief is a function solely of the new evidence statement and the old beliefs; thinking of new hypotheses plays no role in the
theory.9 If the suitor were an orthodox Bayesian, this would be a case of
7
Charles S. Chihara, “Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1987), 551–560.
8
Ibid.,” 558.
9
Otte attempts to accommodate Chihara’s example within Bayesianism, or any rule-based
epistemology, by characterizing the thinking of the new hypothesis as new evidence. This
allows radical conversion to be consistent with rule-based epistemologies, but does so by
making the rule consistent with almost any belief change resulting from a new idea. Any
rule that allows significant belief change based on coming up with a new idea will be a very
permissive rule; very little will be ruled out by any such rule. In this way it is similar to the
previously discussed view according to which seeming right always justifies belief change.
Since most Bayesians do not allow thinking of new hypotheses to be new evidence, thinking
of new ideas may result in cases of radical conversion for them. See Richard Otte, “A Solution
to a Problem for Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
45 (1994), 764–769.
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radical conversion, because the suitor changed his beliefs, but not because
of acquiring any new evidence. According to the prior view, which does
not include the new hypothesis, the suitor should not be confident that
the seventh number will be 69. Holding 69 more likely than other numbers would be irrational. Chihara’s point is that simply thinking of a new
idea can result in our changing our beliefs in ways that are not sanctioned
by our old beliefs. We can view this as the new idea giving us a reason
to think our old evidential relations among beliefs are in error. Chihara’s
example shows that some cases of radical conversion are clearly rational;
we can be rational even if we change beliefs in ways not sanctioned by our
previous commitments.
Van Fraassen’s analysis of the problem of radical conversion in scientific revolutions relies on the ambiguity of scientific language. van
Fraassen argued that we can understand radical conversion by paying
attention to how ambiguities are made clearer. We do not have time to
discuss this in the detail it deserves, but ambiguities can be disambiguated in different ways. van Fraassen’s idea is that in scientific revolutions
the later view can be seen as disambiguating the language in such a way
that the new paradigm is a rational continuation of the prior and the prior
paradigm can be seen as a special case of the latter. From the later view,
vagueness, incompleteness, and ambiguities were seen and made explicit,
and this allows for a way to see the new theory as rationally continuous
with the past.10 Suppose that an ambiguity in a concept results in theory
T being ambiguous between T1 and T2. Evidence might be very unlikely
on T, unlikely on T1, yet very likely on T2. Evidence may disconfirm T,
yet confirm T2. A more fine-grained or disambiguated language may contain evidential relations not contained in the less-detailed language. van
Fraassen gives the example of mass, which illustrates ambiguities giving
rise to different evidential relations. In Newtonian science, mass can be
characterized as proper mass, inertial mass, or gravitational mass.11 These
are different concepts, but because they coincide in the Newtonian framework they were not clearly separated. A Newtonian thinking of mass as
proper mass will think it absurd that mass varies with velocity, whereas
Einstein pointed out that inertial mass varies with velocity. Ambiguities
in the Newtonian framework excluded certain ideas that played a central
role in a relativistic framework. van Fraassen says:
This example shows at least that the most precise language about nature
we have, devised by the most precise of physical scientists, can harbor hidden ambiguities. Here we have the makings of one quick resolution of our
dilemma. Conceptual revolutions bring such hidden ambiguities to light; or
perhaps we should say, conceptual revolutions can occur when they come to
light. So, is the posterior view unintelligible or demonstrably absurd to the

10
11

van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, 114, 115, 151.
Ibid., 113.
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prior? Yes, provided of course that demonstration is given in the ambiguous
language of the past! But no, in the (retrospectively) disambiguated terms.12

In radical conversion our language or conceptual framework changes in a
way that allows the change to be seen as rational.13 Although this handles
many cases of radical conversion, it does not handle all; there may be cases
of radical conversion in which the rationality of changing to the later view
does not primarily depend on previous ambiguity.
Chihara showed that simply thinking of new ideas can result in radical
conversion, and as a result of new ideas it is rational to rearrange and
modify our previous beliefs. It is worth noting similarities between van
Fraassen’s and Chihara’s accounts. For Chihara, thinking of a new hypothesis brings a new concept or idea into the language, and with it we get
a whole new set of evidential relations. For van Fraassen, disambiguation
basically has the same effect. Disambiguating concepts can result in new
evidential relations. In both accounts, our conceptual scheme is expanded
in such a way that new evidential relations arise.
We have seen that there are cases of radical conversion, and some of
these are clearly rational. In addition to van Fraassen’s and Chihara’s examples, in the example of religious experience we saw that the epistemic
implications of having an experience may surprise us, and we may change
our beliefs based on that. In general, cases of radical conversion are ones
in which one comes to hold that one’s previous views about how belief
should change were incorrect. In radical conversion, we hold that some of
our previous beliefs were in error, perhaps because they were not sensitive to ambiguities, perhaps because they did not account for new ideas,
or perhaps because they did not adequately account for experience. From
the later point of view, we were earlier in an impoverished epistemic situation, and in radical conversion we correct that error. Our later views are
not continuous with our previous ones because we hold the previous ones
were in error. We will now use these ideas about radical conversion to
compare the thought of Kierkegaard and Plantinga, focussing on their
ideas about religious conversion.
Kierkegaard
[T]he seeker must lack the truth right up until the moment he receives it; he
cannot even possess it in the form of ignorance, because then the moment
becomes merely an occasion. No, he cannot even be a seeker. This is how
the problem must be characterized if we do not want to revert to a Socratic
account. He must be defined as being outside the truth (not approaching it

Ibid., 114.
This account of radical change also allows van Fraassen to account for cases in which the
later theory retains the predictive power of the predecessor, which is common in scientific
revolutions.
12
13
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as a proselyte, but going away from it), or as being in error. He is thus in a
state of error.14

In Philosophical Crumbs Johannes Climacus expresses several ideas that reject much of traditional epistemology and lead to a very different picture
of our epistemic lives. According to Climacus, we are alienated from God,
and we hold the doctrines of Christianity to be unreasonable, unlikely, or
even absurd. An encounter with God can cause a change from this epistemic state to one where it is held that Christianity is reasonable and very
likely to be true.15 This is a radical change in one’s epistemic life, and is not
based on prior beliefs and evidence combined with standard logical and
epistemic principles; instead, it is based on the passion of faith. As a result
of this new passion, reason will now accept limits to its scope, whereas
the contrary passion of offence will lead reason to not accept religious
mysteries. Reason is not a neutral judge between these different epistemic
positions, which are ultimately based on different passions; these differing
passions result in the old and new epistemic states differing in basic and
fundamental ways. Of course this is a very brief summary of some of the
ideas that Climacus presents, and it is not intended to be anything near an
adequate investigation into Climacus’s thought.
Climacus often says the doctrines of Christianity are preposterous,
absurd, and refers to “the ultimate paradox.” The way to read these comments of Climacus is very controversial. Although I do not here have
time to argue for this position, I will follow the interpretation of Stephen
Evans, who holds that Climacus is not claiming Christian doctrines are
logically inconsistent or violate reason.16 According to Evans, “in saying
Christianity is essentially paradoxical, Climacus is not committed to the
claim that it is logically contradictory and therefore contrary to reason,
but he is committed to the claim that it is something human reason can
never master or comprehend.”17 Christianity may be incomprehensible
without being contrary to reason. Furthermore, “Climacus . . . regularly
uses the term ‘contradiction’ to refer to what might today be designated as
an ‘incongruity,’ with formal logical contradictions seen as a species of the
incongruous.”18 According to this view, in saying Christian doctrines are

14
Soren Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M. G. Piety (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), 92.
15
Characterizing Climacus as holding that Christian belief is probable in any sense is
controversial. According to Climacus the believer will be certain of Christian belief and does
not hold it to be merely probable. However, I am using the term “probable” somewhat differently than Climacus, and holding something to be certain entails holding it to be highly
probable, and in saying the believer holds Christianity to be very probable I am not claiming
it is less than certain. I here merely characterize the believer’s epistemic state very generally,
which may also be complicated by having to renew one’s faith.
16
Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
17
Ibid., 89.
18
Ibid., 100.
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absurd or preposterous, Climacus is claiming they are very improbable,
not that they are logically inconsistent.
One of the most important ideas that Climacus brings up is the idea
that there are fundamentally different epistemic positions, and these
differ on what is reasonable to believe. Beliefs generally are not reasonable
or unreasonable simpliciter, but are reasonable or unreasonable relative
to the rest of one’s beliefs. When discussing whether it is reasonable to
believe something, Climacus instructs us to ask from what perspective we
are judging:
But is that which has been developed here conceivable? We will not be hasty
in answering. . . . Before we reply, we must ask who it is who should answer
the question. To be born, is that conceivable? Yes, why not; but to whom is
it conceivable, one who has been born or one who has not been born? The
latter is preposterous and could not have occurred to anyone, because he
who has been born could never get such an idea. When he who has been
born thinks of himself as having been born, he thinks of this transition from
not being to being. This must also be the case with respect to rebirth. Or does
it make the situation more difficult that the non-being that precedes rebirth
contains more being than the non-being that precedes birth? But who can
conceive of this? It must be he who is reborn, because it, would be preposterous for one who had not been reborn to think it, and would it not be laughable that such a thing could occur to him?19

Although Climacus is discussing who is able to conceive something, we
can view the main point behind his use of “conceive” as being what it is
reasonable to believe. That is why he equates being preposterous with
being unable to conceive. Here Climacus is making the point, often made
in twentieth-century discussions of scientific confirmation, that background beliefs are very important in assessing evidence and confirmation.
A related point is that judgments of probability will also be relative to
one’s other beliefs.
This allows us to better understand Climacus’s claim that Christian
doctrines are improbable, and even “the most improbable.”20 Statements
or propositions are not probable or improbable simpliciter, but are probable relative to some set of beliefs. So Climacus’s claim is that Christian
doctrines are very improbable relative to some set of beliefs; the natural
question is, what set of beliefs or perspective is Christianity improbable
with respect to? The obvious answer is that Climacus’s claim that Christian
doctrines are improbable must be viewed as claiming Christian doctrines
are improbable from the perspective of the unbeliever. One of Climacus’s
most important points is that reason, like probability, depends on other
personal factors, in ways we will explain shortly. When Climacus speaks
of reason, it may appear as if he is speaking of something objective that
is neutral and applies to all people. On the contrary, when speaking of
19
20

Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, 97.
Ibid., 123.

KIERKEGAARD AND PLANTINGA ON RADICAL CONVERSION

171

reason he often is referring to the perspective of the unbeliever; believers
and nonbelievers will have different background beliefs and views about
reason, and Climacus generally talks as if the perspective of the unbeliever
is the default position. Christianity is improbable with respect to the belief
systems held by non-Christians, but Climacus gives us no reason to think
Christian doctrines are improbable for a Christian.
Let us now apply Kierkegaard’s thoughts to naturalism and Christianity. Naturalism and Christianity give very different perspectives on
many issues. Naturalists will generally claim the central doctrines of
Christianity are very unlikely to be true; the idea of God, the incarnation,
and other doctrines, are all held to be extremely unlikely. Christians, on
the other hand, will think it very likely God exists, along with doctrines
such as the incarnation, even if they do not understand them. Although
naturalists and Christians may not go so far as to say the others are irrational (this depends on their views about what it is to be rational and
irrational), both will judge the central doctrines of the other position to be
very unlikely, or preposterous, to use Climacus’s phrase. Each will hold
that the others are not in good epistemic situations and hold beliefs that
are highly unlikely.
Let us suppose that both naturalism and Christianity can be rationally
held; there is no clear objective standard of rationality, such as consistency, that either violates. The question that then arises is whether one can
rationally reason from one of these positions to the other. Is there a way
to reason that will lead a naturalist to become a Christian? Even if both
naturalism and Christianity are rational to hold, it does not follow that
there is a way to rationally change belief from one to the other based on
reasoning. This is simply the question of whether ordinary conversion is
possible, or whether all conversion must be radical conversion.
Climacus claims that Christianity is not the sort of religion we’d get
if we relied on our reason; in effect, he is rejecting the whole project of
natural theology. Climacus sees the non-Christian as not getting closer to
the truth by reason, but as actually moving away from it:
To the extent that he was in error, he was constantly moving away from the
truth, but in having received the condition in the moment, his course was
altered, which is to say that he was turned around. Let us call this change
conversion.21

It is not the case that rational non-Christians will get closer and closer to
Christianity by reasoning; instead, using reason, they will always reject
it as being unreasonable. Because of this, any change from one of these
positions to the other is not a result of applying some neutral reasoning to
available evidence. Conversion is a radical epistemic break with the past;
Climacus even describes it as a rebirth, since it is like the transition from
non-being to being. For Climacus, conversion is radical, not ordinary. But
21
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this does not mean that in conversion we are irrational or epistemically irresponsible. A person who undergoes radical conversion does not believe
what they know is false, nor do they become irrational; on the contrary,
they simply hold their previous beliefs were in error, and are being responsible in correcting them.
Since conversion is radical, according to Climacus, the basis of conversion is not reason, but passion. When confronted with the paradox of God
incarnate, Climacus says we can respond with the passion of faith or the
passion of offense. Conversion does not take place because of reasoning
about some additional evidence, such as religious experience, but depends on our passions. People could have the same evidence or religious
experience, and yet differ wildly on the beliefs formed in response to that
experience. In Climacus’s discussion of the case of the contemporary disciple, we find him dispelling the notion that more evidence is all that is
needed to turn someone into a Christian. Contemporaries of Christ had
lots of factual evidence, more than we could ever have, and yet that is not
relevant to whether one becomes a Christian.22 Without the proper heart,
no amount of evidence will bring about conversion. What matters in the
case of conversion is having the appropriate passion, which Climacus
calls faith. According to Evans, it is easy to miss Climacus’s point that
reason depends on the passions: “From Climacus’s perspective, human
reason is not a disinterested quest for a god-like view of things, but the
expression of a very interested human being.”23 This does not mean that
our beliefs are irrational, or that non-rational leaps or choices are the
foundation of belief. Conversion is not the result of more evidence. What
is needed is a change of heart, which results in radical conversion. Reason
is passionate reason.
According to Climacus, the passion of faith accepts limits to reason,
but the opposite passion of offence does not. Certainly the Christian will
accept that many things about God are simply unknowable by us, in
principle. However, it is equally true that anyone, including naturalists
who have the passion of offence, must recognize the limits of reason. One
result of twentieth-century logic and mathematics is that we now know
that many mathematical statements are undecidable. For example, in
1940 Kurt Gödel showed that we could not disprove the generalized continuum hypothesis within standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, and in
1963 Paul Cohen showed that we could not prove it either; the generalized
continuum hypothesis is undecidable. And even if we stick to empirical
facts, there are facts that all will agree are unknowable; for example, facts
about any possible states of the universe before the big bang, or facts too
far away in space-time. And there are empirical facts not too far away that
are practically unknowable; for example, this morning how many spins
did a leaf from my apple tree make as it fell to the ground unobserved?
22
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But perhaps Climacus has in mind issues like the incarnation or whether
God has a good reason to permit evil that we don’t know about. Many
Christians are not worried by their inability to know God’s reason for permitting evil; they hold that God’s ways are beyond our ways, and it is not
surprising that we are unable to determine God’s reasons. Many naturalists are of the view that if God had a reason to permit evil we’d know what
it was. This issue, and related issues in skeptical theism, are hotly debated
today, and are the sort of issues that Climacus thinks depends on passion
and not reason.
To summarize, according to Kierkegaard’s Climacus, people with different passions have fundamentally different epistemic frameworks. The
passion of faith and the passion of offence lead to epistemological positions that result in different judgments of rationality and irrationality. The
passion of offence results in viewing Christian doctrines as preposterous
and irrational, whereas the passion of faith gives rise to viewing those doctrines as reasonable. On one view, unknowable religious mysteries are not
problematic in the sense of being a sign of falseness or irrationality; reason
is a limited tool, and we shouldn’t expect to comprehend everything. On
the other view, the mysteries make it unlikely the beliefs are true, and it is
irrational to accept them. The difference between these epistemic positions
is not due to one of them having more or less evidence than the other; the
difference is due to different passions, not different evidence. Given this,
it is clear that according to Climacus any change from one position to the
other must be a case of radical conversion; Climacus is clear that one is
not going to become a Christian on the basis of evidence or reason. Passions, not reason nor evidence, enable us to see that our previous way of
looking at things is in error, and give rise to a new set of beliefs. But even
though radical conversion is brought about by passions, these changes
are not irrational in any objective sense. Rationality and epistemic judgments depend on the person and the epistemic situation. From the passion
of offense, becoming a Christian is irrational, but from the standpoint of
faith, the change moves one from a poor epistemic position to a good one.
The appropriate passion helps us correct previous errors in judgment. We
should not expect reason to do what it is unable to do.
Plantinga
Unlike Kierkegaard, Alvin Plantinga is one of the most influential analytic
philosophers of religion. Throughout his career he has investigated the
rational basis of religious belief, and has argued for the rationality of religious belief against various objections. Along with Wolterstorff, Plantinga
was a main developer of what has come to be known as Reformed epistemology. In developing Reformed epistemology, Plantinga argues against
evidentialism: “Evidentialism is the view that belief in God is rationally
justifiable or acceptable only if there is good evidence for it, where good

174

Faith and Philosophy

evidence would be arguments from other propositions one knows.”24 In
these discussions Plantinga limits the required evidence to propositional
evidence, evidence that can be expressed by propositions: “This evidence
would be propositional evidence: evidence from other propositions, and
it would have to come in the form of arguments.”25 One motive for evidentialism is what Plantinga calls classical foundationalism, which he
characterizes as holding that in order for religious belief to be justified, it
has to be basic (self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible) or derivable in some way from basic beliefs. Religious belief may be classified
as irrational or absurd according to evidentialism and classical foundationalism, because religious beliefs are not basic nor are they supported
by basic beliefs. However, Plantinga rejects classical foundationalism and
claims that many religious beliefs are basic for many rational people; thus
these beliefs are justified without being supported by argument. Instead
of being absurd, religious beliefs can be rational.
Theologians in the Reformed tradition are suspicious of natural theology, and although his views have evolved, throughout Plantinga’s work
we find him not looking to argument and natural theology to ground
rational religious belief. Any argument for theism can be resisted by rational people, and there is no argument for the existence of God that all
rational people must accept. Put another way, Plantinga and the Reformed
tradition are very skeptical of positive apologetics, which is the attempt
to prove some central tenets of the Christian religion. This is similar to
Kierkegaard’s idea that one does not become a Christian by reasoning and
evidence.
Although Plantinga is skeptical of arguments and propositional
evidence for religious belief, this does not mean that he thinks religious
belief is groundless, unwarranted, irrational, or without evidence. This
is because Plantinga distinguishes between propositional and nonpropositional evidence, and he holds there can be nonpropositional evidence
for religious belief, even if there is no propositional evidence. Plantinga
argues we have a cognitive faculty, which following Calvin he calls the
sensus divinitatis, that produces religious beliefs in various circumstances.
For example, when I look at the Grand Canyon or a majestic mountain
range, the sensus divinitatis may produce in me the belief that God is
glorious. What is important is that although the resulting religious beliefs
are not based on propositional evidence, they are supported by a form
of nonpropositional evidence. We do not need propositional evidence to
support belief in God, because we have nonpropositional evidence; it is
this nonpropositional evidence that supplies warrant and results in religious belief being rational. In contrast to evidentialism, Plantinga holds
that religious belief can be warranted and rational without being based on
propositional evidence.
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Kierkegaard also recognized the importance of nonpropositional evidence and argued that understanding cannot be reduced to understanding
propositions. In Fear and Trembling he says: “Even if one were able to convert the whole content of faith into conceptual form, it does not follow
that one has comprehended faith, comprehended how one entered into it
or how it entered into one.”26 Without the proper passions we may be able
to have a certain intellectual understanding of Christianity, but we won’t
understand what it means to be a Christian. Rational decisions and beliefs
are based upon much more than our beliefs about certain propositions.
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga applied his more fully developed epistemological ideas to Christian belief. According to Plantinga, a
very rough characterization of warrant is that a belief is warranted if it is
formed by a properly functioning cognitive faculty that is aimed at truth
in an appropriate environment. Thus, warranted beliefs are the result of
properly functioning cognitive faculties. A consequence of this is that religious beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis are warranted if God
exists. The reason for this is that God gave us the sensus divinitatis in
order that we might have true beliefs about him; when working properly
in an appropriate environment, it will lead to true beliefs about God. God
has given us a cognitive faculty that can reliably produce beliefs about
him, and thus beliefs based on this faculty are warranted and rational.
It is worth noting that Plantinga views the sensus divinitatis as one
of our standard cognitive faculties. In general, beliefs produced by our
cognitive faculties are not based on evidence or argument, but are still
considered to be part of the deliverances of reason. For example, according to Plantinga the deliverances of reason include, among others,
the results of cognitive faculties that produce a priori beliefs, beliefs about
the external world, and memory beliefs. Since the sensus divinitatis is a
natural cognitive faculty, the beliefs it produces can be said to be part of
the deliverances of reason:
[A] capacity to apprehend God’s existence is as much a part of our natural
noetic equipment as is the capacity to apprehend perceptual truths, truths
about the past, and truths about other minds. Belief in the existence of God
is in the same boat as belief in other minds, the past, and perceptual objects;
in each case God has so constructed us that in the right circumstances we
form the belief in question. But then the belief that there is such a person as
God is as much among the deliverances of reason as those other beliefs.27

Belief in God is based on reason, and is not a baseless or an arbitrary leap
without evidence.
According to Plantinga’s model, as a result of nonpropositional evidence, belief in God could be warranted for some and not warranted for
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others, even though they have the same propositional evidence. The sensus
divinitatis works to various degrees in different people; in some it may
work well, and in others it may not work at all. Some will have a properly
functioning sensus divinitatis, resulting in warranted belief in God, while
those whose sensus divinitatis is not working may have no rational reason
to form belief in God. Plantinga also argues that if God exists, belief in
God can be warranted (and will be warranted in the case where the relevant faculty is working properly in the right circumstances), whereas if
God does not exist, it probably is not warranted. Thus one’s view about
the warrant and rationality of religious belief will depend on whether one
thinks God exists. From some epistemic situations or perspectives, religious belief will be warranted and rational, yet other epistemic situations
will judge it irrational. This coincides nicely with Kierkegaard’s view that
when assessing the rationality of a belief we need to ask from whose perspective we are judging. Plantinga and Kierkegaard appear to agree that
religious belief will be irrational or unreasonable from the perspective of
the non-religious, but rational from the perspective of a Christian.
In spite of this agreement, it appears that Plantinga’s views about
the reasonableness or justification of religious belief are quite different
from those of Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus. Although Climacus and
Plantinga both agree that religious belief is reasonable from the perspective of a religious person, they differ on why this is so. Plantinga says a
person with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis will have religious
beliefs that are based on reason; Climacus says differing passions instead
of differing cognitive faculties account for the different religious beliefs.
Plantinga gives us an account of reason which applies to both believers
and non-believers; if the sensus divinitatis is not working in non-believers,
they are in the unfortunate situation of lacking a cognitive faculty that
believers have; they are cognitively hindered, and don’t have the full
complement of operating cognitive faculties that humans are supposed to
have. Thus their lack of belief is understandable because it is simply a case
of them having to form beliefs without some of their faculties of reason
working correctly. In contrast to this, Climacus does not account for the
differences between them by the non-believers being cognitively deprived;
the difference between believers and non-believers is not due to different
evidence, propositional or nonpropositional, but is due to different passions. For example, Climacus writes that the contemporary disciple had
no real advantage over us, even though they could see and experience
life with Jesus on a daily basis. These contemporaries had an enormous
amount of nonpropositional evidence about Jesus, but this does not produce faith. According to Climacus, the difference between the believer
and non-believer is not ultimately based on evidence; thus he would reject
Plantinga’s view that the difference between believer and non-believer is
due to nonpropositional evidence. Differences in reasoning are not the
basis of the difference between them. Climacus gives us a very different
picture, one in which the passions move us from the one epistemic state
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to the other. Climacus does not give us an account of nonpropositional
evidence, and for him radical conversion is not based on reason.28 This
does not mean it is unreasonable, because there is a difference between
being beyond reason and being contrary to reason. For Climacus, reason
is not always suited to neutrally choose between positions; reason always
works within a framework or perspective. To go beyond that framework,
one needs the passions.
Plantinga does not specifically discuss the issue of radical conversion.
Since Plantinga usually uses the term “evidence” to refer only to propositional evidence, and much belief change is based on nonpropositional
evidence, there will be many cases in which rational belief change is not
a function of the previous beliefs and new evidence. Many belief changes
typically involve nonpropositional evidence, and there is no way to reason
to the new beliefs from the old using propositional evidence. However,
these belief changes are based on reason, since they are the result of nonpropositional evidence. This indicates that in discussing Plantinga and
radical conversion we should not use the term “evidence” to refer only to
propositional evidence, and should use it in a broader sense that includes
nonpropositional evidence. Plantinga claims that if we take “evidence”
broadly, so that it includes doxastic evidence, then belief is always on the
basis of evidence.29
However, even if we construe “evidence” broadly, there remains the
issue of whether religious conversion is rational according to one’s previous perspective; the issue of radical conversion is not settled by noting
that beliefs are all based on evidence, broadly construed. Earlier we
discussed how evidential relations are relative to a perspective or epistemic framework, and the later perspective seeing the religious beliefs as
based on evidence does not imply that the earlier view will consider the
conversion to be rational and based on evidence. In discussing Plantinga
and radical conversion we should not focus on the term “evidence” and
should instead characterize it in terms of whether the belief change is rational from the prior point of view. But before we discuss this, we need
to first look at Plantinga’s view of the passions, since for Kierkegaard it
was the role of the passions in epistemology that brought about radical
conversion.
A Deeper Agreement
So initially it looks as if Plantinga and Kierkegaard’s Climacus view the
basis of religious belief very differently; for Plantinga it is part of the deliverances of reason based on a cognitive faculty, and for Climacus it is
based on passion. But this initial appearance of difference is deceiving. In
28
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chapter 9 of Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga discusses the relation of
affection to the model of religious belief he presented. Although Plantinga
does not discuss the relation between the sensus divinitatis and affections,
he notes that there are two ways we can view the relation between beliefs
produced by the Holy Spirit and our wills.
What is the relation between affection and belief here, between will and intellect? Which, if either, is primary? Is it that first one sees (i.e., comes to
know or believe) that the great things of the gospel and God himself are
lovely and amiable, and then comes to love them? Or is it rather that first
one comes to love them, thus coming to see that the things in question are,
indeed, worthy of love?30

Basically, we can view a change in affections as being based on a change in
what we believe, or we can view what we believe as being affected by our
affections. After much interesting discussion, Plantinga appears to think
that neither the affections nor belief is primary, and both are dependent
on each other:
There are certain things you won’t know unless you love, have the right
affections; there are certain affections you won’t have without perceiving
some of God’s moral qualities; neither perceiving nor affection can be said
to be prior to the other.31

Although a detailed discussion of how affection affects belief is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is clear that having certain affections can blind
us and prevent us from forming the beliefs we should. But in addition
to this negative influence, the affections often function in a positive way.
There are many cases where having the appropriate affections is necessary
for holding certain beliefs; if we hold the wrong affections, we’ll hold the
wrong beliefs. One reason for this is that belief is not simply a passive affair, and affections can lead us to pay closer attention than we would have
had we lacked the affections. For example, loving or hating someone may
lead us to pay more attention to them than we would if we were indifferent
towards them. With regards to religious beliefs, love of God may make us
much more likely to accept certain beliefs, such as the Christian story.
Plantinga has pointed out that it is unlikely that we will believe things
such as that God is worthy of our love and worship, or that it is proper to
love God, unless we do love him. So we see that without the appropriate
affections our reason may not work the way it was designed to work. Even
if our cognitive faculties are designed to produce certain religious beliefs
in certain circumstances, they will not function properly if we do not have
the right affections. Since Plantinga thinks neither reason nor the affections are more fundamental than the other, both our reason and affections
must change in order for there to be conversion. Without the appropriate
affections, any nonpropositional evidence will be ineffectual.
30
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We can now return to the topic of radical conversion. There are at least
two ways the sensus divinitatis may fail to produce religious beliefs. In
one type of case the sensus divinitatis may simply not operate correctly,
and as a result these people may not believe because they lack the nonpropositional evidence for the religious beliefs. They may even say they
would believe if they had an operating sensus divinitatis. If conversion
occurs here it would be ordinary, not radical, because the prior epistemic
state supported conversion given the evidence provided by an operating
sensus divinitatis. In these cases people fail to believe because they lack
certain nonpropositional evidence, but they agree it would be reasonable
to believe if they had that evidence.
But there are other ways the sensus divinitatis may be ineffectual that
are very different from the above situation. Recall that both proper affections and a properly functioning sensus divinitatis are required to have
faith. This raises the possibility of a lack of faith being due to improper
affections instead of a malfunctioning sensus divinitatis. Some may judge
it unreasonable to hold religious beliefs, even if their sensus divinitatis is
functioning properly. Having the wrong affections may result in holding
that reason requires us to ignore the sensus divinitatis, and to consider
any nonpropositional evidence associated with it to be misleading. A clear
example of this is given by Thomas Nagel. Nagel writes:
My instinctively atheistic perspective implies that if I ever found myself
flooded with the conviction that what the Nicene Creed says is true, the
most likely explanation would be that I was losing my mind, not that I was
being granted the gift of faith. From Plantinga’s point of view, by contrast,
I suffer from a kind of spiritual blindness from which I am unwilling to be
cured. This is a huge epistemological gulf, and it cannot be overcome by the
cooperative employment of the cognitive faculties that we share, as is the
hope with scientific disagreements.32

In this passage Nagel indicates that even if he had the sort of doxastic
evidence provided by the sensus divinitatis, he would judge the religious
beliefs unreasonable. Nagel thinks it would not be right for him to form
religious beliefs based on the sort of evidence the sensus divinitatis gives,
and his epistemic views prevent him from forming religious beliefs on the
basis of the sensus divinitatis.
Now suppose that the sensus divinitatis operates in Nagel and he goes
against his previous commitments and becomes a Christian, believing the
Nicene Creed. This is warranted on Plantinga’s model, even though these
beliefs are unreasonable from Nagel’s previous perspective. Clearly this
would be a case of radical conversion, because Nagel’s new religious beliefs would be unreasonable from the perspective of his old beliefs, even
given the new nonpropositional evidence. We thus see that because the
32
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affections play a fundamental role in Plantinga’s epistemology, as they do
in Kierkegaard’s, instances of radical conversion will be rational.
The relation between the affections and the passions is not clear, and
many identify them and use the terms interchangeably. I think it very
plausible that Kierkegaard and Plantinga are talking about the same thing
when they use the terms “passions” and “affections.” Given this, we see
that Plantinga’s position is very similar to that of Kierkegaard’s Climacus;
both hold that our affections or passions play a fundamental role in what
we believe. So in spite of it looking as if Plantinga and Kierkegaard’s
Climacus have radically different views about the basis of religious belief,
it turns out that initial appearances are deceptive and their views have
much in common. The difference between Plantinga and Climacus may
be more a difference in emphasis than a substantive difference. Plantinga
thinks that neither reason nor affection is more basic than the other; if we
lack either the proper affections or the proper beliefs, we will lack faith.
Throughout Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga tended to focus on how
religious belief could be warranted. Although he discussed the affections,
this was not emphasized as much as belief formation. In contrast to this,
Climacus emphasized the role of the passions in conversion. Climacus is
clear that without the appropriate passion we will lack faith, but he says
little about the basis of the passion of faith. Evans argues that “it is clear
that Kierkegaard does think therefore that to be a Christian one must believe certain things. He simply does not think that those beliefs can be held
in a detached, intellectual manner.”33 In his discussion of responding to
the moment, Climacus focusses on the passion of faith instead of our mind
coming to see things differently. Thus we see that even though they may
emphasize different aspects of conversion, the important thing is that both
Plantinga and Kierkegaard realize that our passions and affections play a
crucial role in radical conversion.34
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